Shadows of the Sage: Images of Confucius in Wei-Jin Thought and Their Philosophical Significance

Inreligious and philosophical traditions around the world, the images of keyfigures inevitably change and develop with changes in the societies and groupsin which they persist, giving rise to debates and disputes that often concerncentral questions of authority over the interpretation of texts and doctrines,and the central figures of Chinese traditions such as Confucius 孔子 and Laozi 老子 are no exception. Suchdebates are often most evident at times of social change and evolution, andthis paper focuses on one such period in Chinese history, namely the Wei-Jinperiod (220-420) after the fall of the Han Dynasty, in which the images anddoctrines of both Laozi and Confucius were undergoing transformations thatwould have lasting effects on Chinese thought and culture. While Laozi wasbecoming a figure in new religious Daoist movements such as the Way of theCelestial Masters 天师道, Confucianism haddeclined in influence from its heights in the Han, and Confucius’ image was thesubject of new debates reflecting the loss of a unified imperial state and therise of Legalist and Daoist ideas among many social elites, most prominentlythe emergence of a coherent philosophical movement of Xuan Xue 玄学 which, while it has often beencharacterised as “Neo-Daoism” by e.g. Feng Youlan 冯友兰 and Wing-Tsit Chan 陈荣捷, nonetheless regarded Confucius asa spiritual “perfect sage” 至圣 above morephilosophical figures such as Laozi and Zhuangzi 庄子.

Yetwhile the new “xuan sheng” 玄圣 promoted by Xuan Xue thinkers represents a significant moment in the evolution ofConfucius, it was by no means universally endorsed, and coexisted with a moretraditional image that reflected the persistence of the late Han Dynasty fusionof practical Confucian social ritual with Legalist views of human nature andlaw that reflected the decline of faith in the more idealistic moral doctrinesof Confucians such as Mencius 孟子 and arguably Confuciushimself. In what follows, I shall first review this more traditional image asexpressed in the ideas of several prominent Wei-Jin Confucian thinkers, andthen examine how key representatives of Xuan Xue attempted to transformsuch views by reinterpreting Confucian texts in Daoist terms, before finallybriefly discussing the philosophical significance of these debates for later developmentsin Chinese philosophy.

Onereason why the Wei-Jin period is not generally regarded as a significant periodin the evolution of Confucianism is that it largely represented a continuationof existing tendencies. During the Han Dynasty, the gradual institutional establishmentof Confucianism was accompanied by an image of Confucius as an “uncrowned king” 素王 who had set down for latergenerations his ideal vision for administrative governance by a virtuous rulerin historical records such as the Spring and Autumn Annals春秋. In this conception, althoughConfucius was bestowed with an authoritative status, this was based on theprecise details of the system of moral codes and ritual practices he set down,the interpretation of which was inevitably subject to debate. With the declineof the Han and the accompanying loss of faith in the possibility of realisingan ideal governance based primarily on moral virtue in such a corruptatmosphere, broadly Confucian thinkers such as Wang Fu 王符 (82-167) and Xu Gan 徐幹 (170-217) progressivelyincorporated increasing proportions of Legalist doctrines into their socialprograms. Prominent among these were the notion that “rewards and punishments” 赏罚 are the “fundamental tenets ofgovernment” (Xu Gan, Balanced Discourses中论, Ch. 19, “Rewards andPunishments” 赏罚) and the basis forproducing order in society, rather than any expectation that people can begenerally expected to act morally of their own accord, even with appropriateeducation and virtuous exemplars.

This view was continued by prominent Confucian thinkers in theWeiJin period such as Fu Xuan 傅玄 (217- 278), whose text Fuzi傅子 opens with thestatement that “There are two handles for governing the state, one is reward,the other is punishment,” whose function is based on their ability to determine“life or death” in a similar manner to the natural phenomena of Heaven andEarth (Fuzi, “Forms of Governance” 治体),recalling the “two handles” of the Legalist Han Feizi 韩非子. As with earlierLegalism-influenced thinkers, this was based on Fu’s view that “the nature ofhuman beings is to avoid harms and follow benefits,” and that the system ofritual propriety established by former kings was designed on this basis (“TheValue of Teaching” 贵教). On this pragmaticview, the governance of the enlightened ruler is primarily a matter ofeffective administration to allocate material benefits, of “pacifying the people”by “dividing out their occupations and unifying their affairs” such that theycan cooperate effectively and not give rise to disorder (“Pacifying the People” 安民). Indeed, Fu agrees with Xunzi’s 荀子 “Discourse on Ritual” 礼论 that, without such asystem of allocation, the desires of human beings would lead them to descendinto struggles and competition, and argues on this basis that “ritual proprietyand righteousness” should in fact be viewed as “the protective screens [藩卫] of the former kings” (“Ritualand Music” 礼乐), since they preventedtheir people from struggling with them and thereby reinforced their rule. ForFu, then, Confucius’ main achievement was preserving this system because heunderstood its benefits both for a state and its ruler, and the Analects   论语 should thus be studied for thedetails of such institutions as the “ceremonies of the imperial court,” “ritualsof engagement,” and “exchanges of dynastic power” (The Analects 论语).

Intheir debates with Xuan Xue thinkers, more traditional Wei-Jin Confucians’viewpoints often take up a similar position, with the Confucian Fu Yi   伏义 in his debate with Ruan Ji 阮籍 (210-263) arguing that “those whoestablish merit and make achievements must base their conduct on sages andworthies” such as Confucius, and “those who wish to rejoice in reality andcultivate their inherent nature must focus on honours and reputation” (“Letterto Ruan Ji” 与阮籍书). Although Fu is clearthat such focused seeking should be based on the actuality of achievement andnot on deception or interpersonal struggle, in accordance with the propriety ofsages and worthies, he is nonetheless also clear that this implies a conceptionof human nature and social order based primarily on self-interest andself-regard, rather than any moral sentiments: “Reputation and benefits are theguiding principle in gathering people together, the gateway in bringingthoroughfares together” (ibid.). In light of this, the mingjiao名教 that has often been regarded asdefining the Confucianism of the Wei-Jin period should perhaps be understoodnot only as a “Teaching of Names” based on the traditional ideal that one’s“name” or position in society (father, son, ruler, minister, etc.) shouldreflect one’s inherent virtue and conduct, as expressed by Confucius himself,but also as implying a “Teaching of Reputation” based on the more Legalist ideathat people’s inherent self-interested desire for a “good name” or reputationis something that should be utilised as a technical instrument to influence theirconduct through rewards and punishments.

PeiWei 裴頠 (267-300) follows a similarpragmatic line as the above in his Confucian critique of Xuan Xue and itsconcept of “non-being” 无, arguing that “it istruly a human affection to be particularly eager for fame and profit,” which heviews as one reason why Xuan Xue adherents “proliferate their subtlephrases” to improve their reputations and gain official positions while “takingno part in administrative duties” (“Treatise in Praise of Being” 崇有论), since they disdain theresponsibilities that come from traditional ritual obligations, all whileregarding this as being without desire for worldly goods. On the contrary,Pei’s ideal “worthy or exemplary men, knowing that desires cannot be extinguished,”focus their attention on practical administrative matters, “use the Dao ofHeaven, divide the profits of the earth, dedicate their energy to their duties,work and then entertain” (ibid.). He thus regards the sage as enacting hisgovernance both through virtue, by “instructing things and setting down anexample,” as well as through “pacifying and ordering the variety of creation,”namely by “arranging all the tasks concerning governance and punishments” and“allotting the residences of the common people, each being conferred with oneof the four professions” (ibid.). As with Fu Xuan and Fu Yi, Pei’s views hereregard Confucius’ ideal of governance as primarily focused on technicalsolutions for the economic management of people’s inherently desirous humannatures such that they can be gathered together and unified to serve the needsof the state, reflecting the probable influence of both Xunzi and Legalism.

Thistechnical tendency in Wei-Jin Confucian thought is reflected in a variety ofother aspects, from Pei Wei’s arguments over the lack of consistent specifiedpunishments in the Jin Dynasty penal code, which he argued “ought to have fixedstandards” (Book of the Jin晋书, “Records” 志), to his intervention inmusicological discussions over fellow Confucian Xun Xu’s 荀勖 (d. 289) attempt to revise thepitches and intonations of the flutes used in ceremonial court music in anattempt to return to those of the Zhou Dynasty, in which Pei argued for firstrevising the balance measures used in imperial medicinal treatments, sinceerrors in these would have serious effects (Book of the Jin, “Biography of PeiWei” 裴頠传).For Xun, however, the correctness of pitch in ceremonial music was not merelyan aesthetic question of taste, but rather part of his broader attempt to usetechnical reforms of musical pitch, poetic forms, and spatiotemporal measuresto restore the orthodox standards of the Zhou, those witnessed by Confucius, inthe belief that accordance with correct ancient ritual would shore up thepolitical authority of the ruling Sima 司马 family (See Goodman, Xun Xu and the Politics of Precision in Third-Century ADChina, Leiden: Brill, 2010). This project was in many ways more purelyConfucian than the more pragmatic legalist-influenced approaches above, yetperhaps precisely for this reason it seems to have failed to exert a widerinfluence. Instead, the main challenge to the above views of Confucius camefrom the emergence of “Xuan Xue.”

Although“Xuan Xue” has often beentranslated as “Neo-Daoism”, and is mostly closely associated with a revival ofinterest in the Daoist Zhuangzi text, which received little attention duringthe Han Dynasty, it was from the beginning also a movement that focused onConfucius and the Analects, with its earliest major representative, He Yan 何晏 (195-249), having compiled andedited the first edition of collected Analects commentaries, Lunyu jijie论语集解. Indeed, the Xuan Xue thinkers’ appreciation of Confucius was something they shared with Zhuangzi,with Confucius appearing as a character in the Zhuangzi as frequently as Laozi,often in scenes of dialogue with his student Yan Hui 颜回 that mimic those in the Analects.His image in the Zhuangzi has long been the subject of attention, sometimesbeing portrayed as a somewhat narrow-minded scholar who is gently mocked andtaught about the dao道 by various Daoistfigures, including Laozi himself, while in other places being made into aspokesperson for Zhuangzi’s key Daoist concepts such as “the fasting of themind”   心斋 (Ch. 4, “In the HumanWorld” 人间世) and “sitting andforgetting” 坐忘 (Ch. 6, “The GreatAncestral Teacher” 大宗师). Such descriptions canbe regarded as the primary source for the new Xuan Xue image of Confuciusas a “xuan sheng” who expressed in hisdaily interactions the Daoist ideals that Laozi and Zhuangzi were only able todescribe in literary or philosophical form.

Thisnew image of Confucius and its relation to Daoism is perhaps most clearlyexpressed in He Yan’s protégé Wang Bi’s 王弼 (226-249) response to Pei Hui’s 裴徽 question as to why,unlike Laozi, the highest sage Confucius failed to mention the “non-being” 无 that Wang, along with He Yan,regarded as supporting the myriad things in their existence. Wang famouslyreplied: “The sage embodies non-being, yet since non-being cannot be taught inwords, his words necessarily relate to being; Laozi and Zhuangzi could also notavoid being, but constantly discussed its insufficiencies” (A New Account ofTales of the World世说新语, Ch. 4, “Letters andScholarship” 文学). According to thisview then, the superiority of Confucius lay in his possessing an unnameablequality that was nonetheless implicit in all his dealings with others,including all his explicit words concerning specific things and events in the Analects. However, Wang’s response here, while a classic example of thespontaneous “pure conversation” 清谈 phrases of the Wei-Jinperiod, is perhaps something of a simplification, since, at least on Wang’s ownreading, the Analects does in fact contain certain explicit suggestions thatConfucius himself also discussed the “insufficiencies” of grasping non-beingthrough words. In Analects 8.19, Confucius praises the sage-king Yao 尧, saying, “How great was Yao as aruler! How majestic! Only Heaven is great, and Yao modelled himself on it. Howvast! The people had no name for him.” While this was traditionally understoodas simply being general praise for Yao’s overflowing virtue, Wang Bi in hiscommentary regarded this as a specific comment on Yao’s embodying a “formlessand nameless” quality based on his lacking any “selfish interest” or“preferential bias,” and instead reflecting a “great love” reflected in hisability to not interfere in the processes of government but rather selflesslyallow them to operate “spontaneously” and objectively, such that his people hadnothing specific to attribute to him individually (Huang Kan 皇侃, Lunyu yishu论语义疏).

Wang’sapproach here is further elaborated in his attribution of a similar quality toConfucius himself when he exclaimed, “I wish to be without words” like Heaven,which says nothing while “the four seasons progress and the hundred things areproduced” (Analects 17.19). For Wang, this was no casual comment on thewordless magnificence of nature, but rather a statement that he“wished to namethe root [of beings]; by raising up the root to govern the branches, hedisplayed things in their ultimate degree” (Huang Kan, Lunyu yishu). Both hereand in the comment on Yao above, Confucius is interpreted as expressing aviewpoint typically attributed to the Laozi, explicitly raising the“insufficiencies” of language to grasp the non-being of the dao as the ultimateroot of existence. In Wang Bi’s view, this represents Confucius’ awareness thatsuch an approach is superior to “establishing words and setting down teachings”(ibid.), which would inevitably simply become instruments to be exploited andelaborated upon, thereby failing to truly change people’s conduct by leadingthem to return to their common root in non-being.

Whilehe differed with He Yan and Wang Bi somewhat on the specific ontological relationbetween beings and non-being, Guo Xiang 郭象 (262-312) followed their account of Confucius as the perfect sage and expandedupon its implications, composing a commentary on the Analects in addition tohis more influential Commentary on the Zhuangzi庄子注 and even quoting Confucius’ “I wish to be without words” from the Analects toexplain the phrase “Heaven and Earth possess great beauty yet do not speak” inthe Zhuangzi (Ch. 22, “Knowledge Wanders North” 知北游).Like He and Wang, Guo regarded Confucius and indeed sages in general aspossessing a “non-mind” 无心 in that they are freefrom deliberate subjective biases and able to “follow their affects andrespond, their responses according to their times,” and thus are “alwaysattentive to language,” unlike Zhuangzi who “never tried to conceal his wildwords” (“Preface to the Zhuangzi” 庄子序).On this account, Confucius had transcended all worldly attachments andconventions, yet precisely because of this, he was able to accord with thedemands of whatever situation he might find himself, “wandering outside inorder to vanish within” (Ch. 6, “The Great Ancestral Teacher”).

Onthis point, Guo’s interpretation of Confucius raises certain questions: didConfucius in fact transcend all worldly attachments and concerns? When Analects 11.10 records how Confucius “wailed with profound grief” at the death of YanHui, Guo seems forced to interpret this according to the above impassive modelon which the sage merely externally mimics the conventional conduct of others:“When others wailed, he also wailed; when others were profoundly grieved, hewas profoundly grieved; this is how one without feelings transforms togetherwith things” (Huang Kan, Lunyu yishu). At first glance, it seems that Guo isendorsing He Yan’s position that the sage is “without feelings” in his debatewith Wang Bi, a position which Wang famously refuted by arguing that the sagemust share the same feelings as other people; it is simply that he “responds tothings without being caught up by them” (Record of the Three Kingdoms   三国志, commentary on “Biography of ZhongHui” 钟会传) and thus respondsappropriately rather than excessively. However, examination of Guo’s relatedcomments to the Zhuangzi suggests that his view was in fact somewhat differentto both of these, such as his reference to how “perfect benevolence culminatesin being without partiality” in his “Preface,” his attribution of the view that“benevolence is the external trace of universal love” to Confucius (Ch. 6, “TheGreat Ancestral Teacher”), and his sole comment on the “Old Fisherman” 渔父 chapter, in which he describes howConfucius’ quality of being “universal with nothing beyond” was such that “evenamong things like crawling animals, all received his complete concern” (Ch. 31). Based on this, it seems that Guo’s position was that Confucius possessed alatent universal, impartial concern that was spontaneously triggered andthereby concretised appropriately in response to his situational context,including in his profound relationship with Yan Hui.

Asthe above suggests, Guo strongly emphasised the idea that the sage is not attachedto any fixed traditional systems or future ideals, “looking neither forward norbackward but rather according completely with the present, vanishing to becomeone with the present age” (Zhuangzi, Ch. 4, “In the Human World”), his onlymethod being his “absence of method” (Ch. 6, “The Great Ancestral Teacher”).Given that in other thinkers such as the Confucians considered above, such aview generally represents their departure from traditional Confucian orthodoxyin favour of the pragmatic realism of Legalism in the face of a world where theformer no longer seems viable, one might wonder whether Guo shares thistendency, especially given his approval of technical progress as displayed,e.g., in his comments on Confucius’ purported discussion of “Mr. Chaos”(Zhuangzi, Ch. 12, “Heaven and Earth” 天地).In the longest extant passage from his Analects commentary however, on Section2.3, Guo goes to great lengths to defend Confucius’ criticism of governance bylaw in favour of governance by virtue, arguing that the former simply leadspeople to “feign compliance” and “evade” punishments, producing only theflimsiest moral transformation, while the latter is interpreted in a Daoistmode as leading people to fulfil their inherent nature, including a sense ofshame, and thereby rectify themselves “without need for rules” (Huang Kan, Lunyu yishu). This Confucian ideal is reflected in Guo’s rather un-Daoistcomment that “benevolence and righteousness are spontaneously people’s feelingsand inherent nature, and should simply be trusted in” (Zhuangzi, Ch. 8, “WebbedToes” 骈拇), a statement thatwould seem to situate his view fairly close to Mencius’optimistic conception ofuniversal innate moral potential, and clearly in opposition to Legalism’sscepticism about traditional Confucian morality.

Despitethis, Guo does not simply set aside the critical perspective on Confucianismoffered by both the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, but rather views it as implying arejection not of Confucius’ ideal of governance by virtue, but of how Confucianmethods of governance come to be exploited by later rulers for their ownbenefit: “Rulers of later generations will admire the long-lasting paths laiddown by Zhongni [Confucius], going on to hold back their inherent natures,distort themselves, and use artificiality to preside over the people, thoseabove and below emulating one another and thus losing their spontaneousknowing” (Zhuangzi, Ch. 32, “Lie Yukou” 列御寇).For Guo, this process is inevitable, and constitutes the fate of Confucius, inwhich “his fame consisted of shadows and echoes, and these shadows and echoesbecame the cuffs and shackles for his form and voice” (Ch. 5, “Tallies ofVirtue Replete” 德充符), a tragic fate inwhich his ideal of virtuous governance would inevitably come to be sacrificedon the altars of ritual orthodoxy and state power, his true formless imagebecoming lost in the deceptive shadows that it gave rise to. Based on thediscussion above, it seems likely that Guo had in mind precisely the mainstreamaccounts of Confucian thought offered by the Legalism-influenced Confucians ofhis day, in which Confucius had become a figurehead for doctrines that wentagainst what Guo, like Wang Bi before him, saw as his true message.

Withits debates over apparently contradictory pairs of concepts such as non-beingand being 有, or spontaneity andthe Teaching of Names, Wei-Jin thought has often been seen as one defined bythe opposition between Confucianism and Daoism. Such a view was already clearlywidespread both at the time, in Fu Yi and Pei Wei’s critiques of Xuan Xue,and later in the period, with Zhang Tianxi 张天锡 (344-404) summarising the trends of his Eastern Jin era by saying, “Those whostudy and probe into matters obscure and remote are carrying on the traditionof Wang Bi and He Yan; those who are complying with the times and revising thelaws do so in the manner of Xun Xu and Yue Guang 乐广”(A New Account of Tales of the World, Ch. 2, “Speech and Conversation” 言语). In this context, the Confucianelements of Wang Bi and Guo Xiang’s Xuan Xue thought have often been seenas reconciling such contradictions and overcoming these oppositions, especiallyas exemplified in Guo’s alleged view that “the Teaching of Names isspontaneity” (名教即自然, a phrase which doesnot occur in any of his extant texts, even in a similar form). However, fromthe above discussion, this viewpoint seems more problematic. While Wang and Guoevidently believed that Confucius himself embodied a spiritual ideal perfectlyconsistent with their Daoist accounts of the “xuan sheng,” one perhaps also withelements of Mencius’ moral optimism, their reconstructed Confucianism remains asignificant distance away from both the pragmatic Legalism-influenced thoughtof their more explicitly “Confucian” forebears and contemporaries such as XuGan and Fu Xuan, and the obsession with accordance with historical ritualminutiae seen in a figure like Xun Xu.

Inthis sense, rather than finding ways to reconcile their Daoist principles withthe existing Confucianism of their day, the Xuan Xue thinkers above shouldperhaps be seen as creating a new image of Confucius and a reinterpretation of histhought based on the hermeneutic techniques and suggestive depictions found inthe Zhuangzi. Such a new image bears similarities with both later medievalBuddhist-Confucian syntheses, as well as the Buddhism-influenced Neo-Confucianthought of the Song and Ming dynasties, particularly in its emphasis onspiritual detachment, metaphysical principles, and moral optimism. Given itsview of Confucius as embodying an abstract moral ideal that can be realised inan array of differing concrete social and political systems across history,rather than being limited to the “shadows” of any specific ritual program, italso has significant relevance for discussions of the fate of Confucianism inthe modern world, with the Wei-Jin debates over Confucius in many waysreflecting contemporary arguments over how Confucian spiritual, moral, social,and political ideals should be implemented in a vastly changed historicalcontext. Finally, despite the Xuan Xue view that Confucius as a “xuan sheng” existed on a higher spiritual plane than Laozi, Zhuangzi, and otherpre-Qin thinkers with their philosophical discussions, this image of Confuciusis also one that gives him a profound philosophical significance, one all too easilyoverlooked in superficial readings of the Analects such as that of Hegel, whichonly perceive its concrete rituals and moral codes, remaining stuck at thelevel of “shadows and echoes.”